The Braid Diffie-Hellman public key cryptosystem is based on the Diffie-Hellman version of a decomposition problem (DP) in the braid group B n . We propose a linear algebra attack on DP via the faithful Lawrence-Krammer representation ρ n . For generic and sufficiently long instance braids we recover the ρ n -image of the private key using just one matrix inversion.
Here we deal with the revised version of the braid Diffie-Hellman KAP suggested at the ASIACRYPT 2001 [5] :
Let L B m and U B n−m (m < n) be the commuting subgroups of the n-braid group B n :=< σ 1 , . . . , σ n−1 | σ i σ j = σ j σ i , |i− j| > 1 , σ i σ i+1 σ i = σ i+1 σ i σ i+1 ∀i = 1, . . . , n −2 > generated by σ 1 To recover the private key (a l , a r ) ∈ L B 2 m of A(lice) it is sufficient to solve the following decompositon problem (DP):
n such that y A = a l xa r for some a l , a r ∈ L B m .
Objective:
A solution for the DP induces a solution for the DH-DP. In the case a l = a −1 r and b l = b −1 r we obtain the original braid Diffie-Hellman key agreement scheme, which is based on a Diffie-Hellman version of the generalized conjugacy search problem (GCSP) [16] . The fact that in general a l = a −1 r (and b l = b −1 r ) for the revised scheme is indeed its advantage: a l and a r are in general not in the same conjugacy class. So attacks, which (frequently) use conjugacy operations like Cycling attacks [11] and Gebhardt's computation of Ultra Summit Sets [10] , do not work.
We can restrict to the monoid versions DP + and DH-DP + , in which each braid group is replaced by the corresponding monoid of positive braids, because we can multiply the equations y A = a l xa r , y B = b l xb r by a sufficiently high power of the square of the Garside element 2 n , which generates the center of B n .
Representation attacks and previous work
Linear algebra or representation attacks on braid-based cryptosystems work as follows:
(I) Choose a linear representation ρ: B n −→ G L(k, R) of the n-braid group for some ring R and k ∈ N, and compute the images of the instance braids for this representation. (II) Solve the base problem in the matrix group G L(k, R). Keep in mind that there will be infinitely many solutions in general, and that not all solutions are in imρ ⊂ G L(k, R). (III) Find preimage braids for solutions in im ρ.
2.1 Linear algebra attack on DH-DP + via Lawrence-Krammer representation [6] Let V denote the free Z[t ±1 , q ±1 ]-module of rank n 2 with basis {x i j |1 ≤ i < j ≤ n}. The Lawrence-Krammer (LK) representation [19] ρ
was proved to be faithful by Bigelow and Krammer [3, 17, 18] for all n and even if q is a real number with 0 < q < 1. We use the abbreviation ρ n := ρ n | q=1/2 . Then the Cheon-Jun attack on DH-DP + works roughly as follows. For technical details see [6] .
A l is invertible with overwhelming probability, so we can compute
Note that in general (A l ) −1 = A l := ρ n a l and A r = A r := ρ n a r , and (A l ) −1 and A r need not to lie in im ρ n .
We remark that we can change the system (1), (2) by vectorization into a highly overdetermined linear system with (2n − 2m − 1) inverting the LK-representation based on the ideas of Krammer [18] . Applying this algorithm to (A l ) −1 Y B A r = n (K ) we obtain the unique preimage braid K .
So the Cheon-Jun attack provides a polynomial time solution to the DH-DP. Nevertheless the complexity is too large to break the cryptosystem with the proposed parameters in [5, 16] efficiently.
2.2 Linear algebra attack on DP + via Burau representation [20] Let W denote the free Z[q ±1 ]-module of rank n with basis {w i |1 ≤ i ≤ n}. The (unreduced) 3 
provides the following special attack on DP + , but only in the symmetric case 2m = n:
Then we obtain the following block matrix equations:
In the case 2m = n the offdiagonal blockmatrices X LU , X U L are quadratic. The probability that X LU or X U L have full rank for randomly chosen x ∈ B + n increases for n = const and increasing word length |x|, and for |x| = const and decreasing braid index n (n ≥ 5) [20] . If at least one of these two offdiagonal matrices is regular, so we obtain
In [15] Ko suggests the following countermeasure: Choose a x, which contains just a few generators σ m .
(III) The Burau representation is proved to be not faithful for n ≥ 5 [2] . The best known algorithms for computing preimage braids for the Burau representation are the heuristic Hughes algorithm [13] and its variations by Lee and Park [20] . Applying it to A l or A r we might obtain a l or a r , and that's sufficient to solve DP. But the success rates of these heuristics decreases for m = const with increasing word length |a|, and they are very low for the parameter values suggested in [5] .
Cryptanalysis
Now we use ideas from Lee and Park [20] to develop an attack on DP + via LKrepresentation.
Symmetric case 2m
2 ). The basis is reordered according to the DP-induced decomposition of V by the transformation φ :
So we get the following block matrix structures for embedded braids:
The commutativity equation ab = ba ∀a ∈ L B m ∀b ∈ U B n−m yields the following block matrix equations:
Our representation attack contains the following steps:
(I) Compute the images of the instance braids:
(II) The UL-block matrix from
. X U L is quadratic for 2m = n and non-singular with increasing probability for increasing |x| (n = const) and decreasing n (|x| = const) (Table1). If X U L is regular, we can compute
, and compute
has with high probability full rank for sufficiently long u, and we obtain 
Asymmetric cases
(a) n < n −m Here we have to replace m by m := n/2 (n even) or m := (n +1)/2 (n odd) in the definitions of L , M, U . If n is even the problem is reduced to the symmetric case n = 2m . One hundred random experiments were executed for each entry. A randomly chosen x ∈ B + n is rejected, if it doesn't contain all Artin generators But if n is odd we have to embed the problem into B 2m and compute images of the instance braids for ρ 2m . Choose the decomposition 
is quadratic, and regular for generic, suffi-
we reduce case (b) to case (a). Note that we perform now an attack on Bob's private key, while in case (a) we only can compute the private key of Alice. 
So recovering p r depends on the regularity of the quadratic block matrix
Another way is to choose a r ∈ U B n−m , b r ∈ L B m (and keep a l ∈ L B m , b l ∈ U B n−m ) or vice versa. But in this case we can attack the DP, if one of the quadratic matrices X UU or X L L is invertible.
Further generalizations e.g. by introducing refined partitions of each area, can be treated with similar methods. 
Appendix: complexity analysis
So we can work in the residue class field
. This allows us to estimate the costs of the ring operations. Using Schönhage-Strassen method one multiplication in Z p takes O(log p log log p log log log p) 4 and a multiplication in
Step II:
The matrix inversion has the same asymptotic complexity of O(m 2τ ) operations in F as matrix multiplication. The feasible matrix multiplication exponent τ is 3 for classical algorithms, log 2 7 using Strassen's method, and the current world record is τ < 2.376 ( [9] , section 12.1). Therefore the asymptotic complexity of step II is about O ∼ (m 2τ +2 l 3 ).
Step III: Invert the Lawrence-Krammer representation.
In [6] the authors errouneously assume that the complexity of their Algorithm 1 for inverting the Lawrence-Krammer representation is dominated by the computation of a power of ρ n n . This is not the case, because we can compute even powers by formula ρ n 2k n = t 2k q 2nk I ( n 2 ) and ρ n n is sparse -it has the support of a permutation matrix.
Therefore the complexity of Algorithm 1 [6] is dominated by Note that the precomputation of the Krammer matrices of l permutation braids takes O ∼ (m 6 l) bit operations:
